Piotr Dworczak
I am a Professor of Economics in the Adenauer School of Government at the University of Cologne, a Professor in the Department of Economics at Northwestern University (on leave), and a Researcher at GRAPE. I work on Mechanism and Information Design, combining research in pure theory with more applied interests in Inequality-aware Market Design and Financial Over-the-Counter Markets.

What’s new:
- Robust Trust, new draft, with Alex Smolin, November 2026
- Pareto-Improving Pricing: Why 3 Is Better Than 2, new paper, with Zi Yang Kang, September 2026
- Privacy for Sale: Anarchy, Ban, or Market?, new paper, with Jacopo Perego and Laura Veldkamp, September 2026
- Searchable Menus, new paper, with Frank Yang, August 2026
- Optimal Transparency in Over-the-Counter Markets, new draft, with Maren Vairo, August 2026
- A Mechanism-design Approach to Property Rights, new draft, with Ellen Muir, October 2026
- Optimal Redistribution via Income Taxation and Market Design, new draft, with Pawel Doligalski, Mohammad Akbarpour, and Scott Kominers, December 2025
My research agendas:
The descriptions below focus on connections between my papers, not marginal contributions to the literature.
Policymakers concerned about inequality in access to economic resources often introduce rules constraining transactions in individual markets—such as rent control—or even choose to distribute goods and services by circumventing markets completely, as is frequently the case for health care or public housing. Traditional economic intuition opposes such policies because they create allocative inefficiencies. This intuition is rooted in the celebrated welfare theorems. But when information about agents’ needs is imperfect, the welfare theorems no longer apply, and redistributive goals could conflict with efficiency. The IMD agenda asks how markets should be designed when both inequality and imperfect information are unavoidable features of the environment.
In Redistribution through Markets (with Scott Kominers and Mohammad Akbarpour), we investigate how the equity-efficiency trade-off is resolved in the simplest possible two-sided market for an indivisible homogeneous good. If inequalities in the market are sufficiently pronounced and market behavior can be used to identify agents with the greatest need, welfare maximization may require the use of price controls and rationing. This paper is a conceptual introduction to the IMD research agenda, focusing on economic intuitions; the follow-up paper, Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms is more operational: We study a one-sided allocation problem with heterogeneous object qualities, accommodating observable characteristics of agents, and allowing the market designer to have flexible preferences over revenue. The paper provides tools for solving mechanism-design problems with a redistributive objective and formulates high-level policy implications. You can see a presentation of this paper here.
This research agenda is the focus of my ERC grant at GRAPE. For a short summary, you can take a look at the letter I wrote for SIGecom Exchanges: Inequality and Market Design. You can also check out a keynote lecture I delivered during the 2026 SAET conference here. Or read more about the papers in the agenda below:
In An Economic Framework for Vaccine Prioritization (with Mohammad Akbarpour, Eric Budish, and Scott Kominers), we add externalities to the IMD framework. This allows us to study the problem of optimal allocation of vaccines in the presence of redistributive preferences. We show that the welfare-maximizing mechanism calls for a combination of priorities (based on observable information) with prices (that additionally allow to screen for unobserved characteristics)—in contrast to how COVID-19 vaccines were allocated in practice.
We also study allocative externalities in Optimal Membership Design (with Marco Reuter, Scott Kominers, and Changhwa Lee), focusing on how access to a community or platform should be regulated when potential members contribute differently to the value that others obtain from joining. Rationing may arise in such problems even if the designer is primarily concerned with revenue.
In A Price Theory of Price Gouging (with Scott Kominers), we provide an economic definition of price gouging, a phenomenon that is widely debated but has received surprisingly little attention in the economic theory literature. We say that price gouging occurs in a competitive equilibrium when the market-clearing price does not maximize utilitarian welfare. We argue that this simple definition leads to policy implications that align surprisingly well with existing regulations.
Pareto-Improving Pricing: Why 3 Is Better Than 2 (with Zi Yang Kang) deals with another application in which equity concerns are very salient: congestion pricing (and, more generally, pricing priority). Economists have argued for at least half a century in favor of market-based solutions to alleviate congestion externalities, but these solutions remain unpopular due to the perception that they create winners and losers. Our paper shows, in a general framework, that pricing priority must indeed create losers relative to the “equal-allocation benchmark” if only two priority tiers are used. However, three tiers are enough to achieve a strict Pareto improvement.
In a short policy paper, A market-design response to the European energy crisis (with Mohammad Akbarpour, Scott Kominers, and Filip Tokarski), we apply our prior results to derive simple predictions about optimal regulation of energy prices.
The paper Privacy for Sale: Anarchy, Ban, or Market? (with Jacopo Perego and Laura Veldkamp) studies a different framework, but it connects to the IMD agenda by deriving redistributive consequences of different regulations of third-party data sharing. In particular, we show that—perhaps surprisingly—data markets tend to primarily benefit the poor.
In contexts where policymakers care about fairness and equity, another type of market distortion is frequently used to allocate resources: ordeals. An ordeal is any type of activity that is costly to perform and does not directly benefit anyone (e.g., standing in line or filling out complicated forms). Nevertheless, ordeals could be optimal to use if they screen for the “right” agents. In How to Allocate Money?, I ask a simple question: When allocating financial aid to agents with unobserved heterogeneous values for money, is it better to offer a lump-sum payment or screen through an ordeal? Because the equity-efficiency trade-off takes a particularly sharp form, the solution provides intuitions for other papers in the agenda (so the paper might be a good start if you are new to the topic). In practice, policymakers also face the dilemma of which ordeal to use. We provide guidance on this question in Comparison of Screening Devices (with Frank Yang and Mohammad Akbarpour) by decomposing the welfare effects of using an ordeal into a rent-provision and a targeting-effectiveness channel. This paper connects to the rich empirical literature on this topic by deriving several empirical tests of when one screening device dominates another.
Most papers in the IMD agenda adopt a market-design perspective, studying how a single market should be designed in isolation. This is motivated by the observation that policymakers often do attempt to redistribute through markets; we might as well help them do it more effectively. However, it is also important to understand whether such policies can remain desirable when conventional tools for redistribution—such as income taxation—are available. The natural starting point is the celebrated Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem, which gives a negative answer in an important benchmark case: when agents differ only in their ability to earn income and preferences are separable between labor supply and consumption, there is no need to supplement optimal income taxation with distortions in goods markets. This creates a direct theoretical challenge for the IMD agenda: whenever the Atkinson-Stiglitz conclusion applies, market-level interventions add no value—and may in fact be harmful—as a redistributive policy tool.
Studying the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem led to Incentive separability (with Pawel Doligalski, Joanna Krysta, and Filip Tokarski). In this paper, we employ a mechanism-design approach to provide a unified treatment, with simple proofs, that delivers the Atkinson-Stiglitz and Diamond-Mirrlees theorems (along with a new application) as special cases. I particularly recommend the paper to microeconomic theorists who are new to public finance and may find the original papers difficult to parse.
In Optimal Redistribution via Income Taxation and Market Design (with Pawel Doligalski, Mohammad Akbarpour, and Scott Kominers), we take on the challenge head-on. We investigate the optimal interaction between income taxation and goods market distortions by studying a model in which agents differ both in their ability to earn income and in their tastes for goods. We identify knife-edge conditions under which the Atkinson-Stiglitz result holds in such a framework, but then show that market-level interventions are part of the optimal policy mix when these conditions fail.
Mechanism design is the primary methodological tool I use in my research. What draws me to it is the combination of generality and elegance. By isolating the fundamental economic frictions and trade-offs, mechanism design makes it possible to abstract from many of the institutional details of a particular application while still generating insights into concrete policy problems.
The Inequality-aware Market Design agenda is largely built on this approach. Mechanism design is particularly well suited to studying the equity-efficiency trade-off at a fundamental level: it allows for a flexible welfare objective that can capture a range of redistributive preferences, while letting private information shape the set of feasible allocations. I also use mechanism-design tools in other applied settings, including my work on Financial Over-the-Counter Markets, to study how trading institutions and disclosure rules shape market outcomes.
Beyond these applications, there are several questions within mechanism-design theory that I find particularly important and interesting. Much of my work in this area has focused on three broad themes: the optimal transparency of trading mechanisms, the design of property rights, and the trade-off between simplicity and complexity.
I have been fascinated by the issue of optimal transparency of trading mechanisms since my early grad school years. Most theoretical models study trading mechanisms (e.g., auctions) in a “vacuum,” abstracting away from subsequent interactions taking place in a wider market context, the “aftermarket.” In my job market paper, Mechanism Design with Aftermarkets: Cutoff Mechanisms, I studied a framework in which the agent who acquires a good in an allocation mechanism subsequently interacts with third parties, for example in a resale game. In such a setting, the mechanism designer has an additional tool at her disposal: she can disclose information about the agent’s behavior in the mechanism. The transparency of the mechanism matters because it changes the information structure—and hence the equilibrium outcome—of the aftermarket. I focused on cutoff mechanisms, which provide a robust way of designing the allocation and information structure without relying on all the details of the aftermarket. These mechanisms are implementable for all aftermarkets and, under additional conditions, optimal in submodular aftermarkets. Their structure makes the interaction between the mechanism-design and information-design parts of the problem particularly transparent and tractable.
In two spin-off papers, I moved beyond cutoff mechanisms by studying simpler environments in which the unrestricted problem can be analyzed. In Mechanism Design with Aftermarkets: Optimal Mechanisms under Binary Actions, I studied optimal mechanisms for a tractable class of aftermarkets, and in Mechanism Design with Aftermarkets: On the Impossibility of Pure Information Intermediation, I considered a version of the model in which the designer acts solely as an information intermediary, with no allocation of a good.
If you’re curious how the agenda started, you can also check out the paper I wrote in my first year of grad school, The Effects of Post-Auction Bargaining between Bidders, which studied the problem from a purely game-theoretic perspective. One thing I still like about that paper is that it is one of very few attempts to solve for mixed-strategy equilibria in auctions followed by an aftermarket.
My recent work with Jacopo Perego and Laura Veldkamp on third-party data sharing, Privacy for Sale: Anarchy, Ban, or Market?, studies a similar two-stage framework but focuses on a different application and derives direct policy-relevant insights. In the model, a firm first interacts with a consumer in a product market; a transaction with the consumer generates a data record. The firm can then sell this data to a third party, who chooses a data utilization level that affects the consumer’s utility. Although data is traded at a price, the second stage has the structure of an information-design problem: the firm can shape how informative the data record is about the consumer’s type, and this choice affects how the third party subsequently treats different consumers. The paper focuses on the effects of regulation: data anarchy, a benchmark resembling the status quo under which firms cannot make binding data-policy promises and hence sell all valuable records; a data ban, which shuts down the sale of consumer data; and a data market, under which firms can commit to a data policy, including the option to withhold records. The main insight is that both the structure of the resulting equilibria and the welfare results depend critically on the sign of the “privacy beta,” which measures whether consumers with a higher willingness to pay for the product have a higher or lower willingness to pay for privacy. We argue that the data market provides a robust, albeit imperfect, policy solution that tends to benefit poorer consumers in particular.
Two other research agendas emerged from my interest in optimal transparency. On a more technical side, studying transparency requires tools at the intersection of mechanism and information design. Implementability, Walrasian Equilibria, and Efficient Matchings (with Anthony Zhang) was an attempt to understand mechanism design with a multidimensional allocation space—a case frequently arising when information disclosure is part of the mechanism’s outcome. I have also worked on new solution techniques to pure information design problems (see the Information Design section). On a more applied side, I investigated optimal transparency in the context of financial markets (see the Financial Over-the-Counter Markets section).
Practical applications of mechanism design often call for mechanisms that are simple enough for real-life agents to understand. A compelling argument in favor of simplicity is that the outcome of a complex mechanism may be unpredictable when agents cannot figure out their optimal strategies. In Are Simple Mechanisms Optimal when Agents are Unsophisticated? (with Jiangtao Li), we show that this logic is not always correct. There exist complex mechanisms that strictly outperform the best simple mechanism even if agents always resolve their strategic uncertainty in the worst possible way for the designer. At the same time, we identify environments in which no complex mechanism can robustly outperform the best simple one.
Simplicity is a particularly important concern in multidimensional mechanism-design problems, which are notoriously difficult to solve and often generate complicated mechanisms. In Searchable Menus (with Frank Yang), rather than searching directly for mechanisms that are simple for the designer, we impose a simplicity constraint on the agent. Specifically, we require that the menu implementing the mechanism can be ordered so that, regardless of the agent’s preferences, a greedy search always finds the optimal choice: every local optimum must also be a global optimum. In a multi-product monopoly problem, optimal searchable mechanisms take the form of sparse upgrade menus, with higher tiers offering more of every good and the number of tiers bounded by the number of goods. In a multidimensional income-taxation problem with rich heterogeneity, searchability is equivalent to progressivity of the tax schedule. This paper is part of an ongoing research agenda that seeks to make progress by reformulating the multidimensional screening problem in economically meaningful ways, rather than by developing new mathematical tools for solving its original formulation.
While property rights have been extensively studied in economics, most analyses take their form as given and consider the effects of reallocating them among different economic actors. In contrast, in A mechanism-design approach to property rights (with Ellen Muir), we fix who holds the property right but allow the right itself to be flexibly designed. In other words, we abstract away from the design of the allocation mechanism and instead focus on the design of what is being allocated. The key idea is that, at a fundamental level, a property right determines its holder’s outside options in subsequent economic interactions. This perspective allows us to use mechanism-design techniques to characterize the optimal property right and show that its form can differ substantially from conventional property rights. The analysis also connects to the literature on mechanism design with type-dependent outside options. In particular, we develop a new solution technique for such problems based on the classical Myerson ironing procedure.
Much of my research studies the role of information in markets. This part of my agenda develops tools, models, and solution concepts for information design, with a particular focus on the canonical Bayesian persuasion framework.
Bayesian persuasion problems admit a conceptually simple solution through concavification of the Sender’s value function. In practice, however, this procedure can be difficult except in the simplest cases. In the most technical of my research agendas, I explore duality as a solution method for information-design problems. In The Simple Economics of Optimal Persuasion (with Giorgio Martini), we show that the optimality of a persuasion scheme can be established using a price function for posterior beliefs: the Sender can be viewed as a consumer who purchases posterior beliefs subject to a budget constraint. This approach yields a tractable solution method when the Sender’s value function depends only on the induced posterior mean. The Persuasion Duality (with Anton Kolotilin) provides a unified treatment of duality in persuasion problems. The paper gives a geometric interpretation of the dual variable, establishes strong duality in a general setting, and develops an application to multidimensional moment persuasion, thereby extending and clarifying the connections among earlier approaches.
When using information-design models in more applied work, I have always been concerned about the assumption that the Sender can perfectly predict the information the Receiver obtains from other sources. In many standard models, this issue is avoided by assuming that the Sender is the Receiver’s sole source of information. In Preparing for the Worst but Hoping for the Best: Robust (Bayesian) Persuasion (with Alessandro Pavan), we develop a robust approach that relaxes this assumption. The Sender has a conjecture about the Receiver’s learning environment but does not fully trust it. She first restricts attention to information policies that provide the best payoff guarantee against the adversarial learning scenario, and then uses her conjecture to choose among these worst-case-optimal policies. We show that the resulting robust solutions remain tractable and can be characterized using tools developed for the standard persuasion model, including duality techniques.
My most recent work in this area combines information-design tools with robustness ideas to study alignment in AI-assisted decision making. In Robust Trust (with Alex Smolin), we model an agent who combines a private signal with advice from an informed but potentially misaligned adviser, such as an AI system. We take a robust approach by assuming that, when misaligned, the adviser behaves adversarially. The solution concept resembles the one from the paper discussed above, but here misalignment occurs with a known probability, reflecting different levels of trust in AI’s reliability. The main result shows that the agent should follow a “trust-region strategy“: advice is followed when it induces a posterior inside the trust region, while advice that would move beliefs outside the region is optimally clipped back to its boundary. The paper suggests decision protocols for using AI advice productively while limiting the consequences of potential misalignment.
One of the defining features of financial over-the-counter markets—relative to traditional centralized exchanges—is their opacity. Traders in OTC markets often lack information about quotes available in the market and must search for a counterparty; they may also be unable to access information about past transaction prices. Regulators have been concerned about OTC market opacity, and they frequently intervene to increase market transparency. Given my theoretical interest in transparency from mechanism-design and information-design perspectives, financial OTC markets have become an important part of my agenda.
In Benchmarks in Search Markets (with Darrell Duffie and Haoxiang Zhu), we investigate the role of benchmarks in improving transparency by revealing information about average prices in the market. We derive conditions under which introducing a benchmark to an otherwise opaque market increases efficiency; we analyze the optimal disclosure mechanism using information-design tools; and we ask whether benchmarks are likely to be supported by market participants or require regulatory intervention. Benchmarks fulfill their informational role only if they reflect true information about market fundamentals. The so-called LIBOR scandal revealed that some of the most important financial benchmarks were routinely being manipulated for private benefit by large traders. We provide a response to this problem in Robust Benchmark Design (with Darrell Duffie), where we characterize the optimal benchmark design based on transaction data generated by strategic traders whose incentives depend on the value of the benchmark. Effectively, we study the problem of an econometrician trying to construct an efficient estimator, with the twist that the choice of estimator directly affects the data-generating process itself.
Benchmarks are just one source of transparency in OTC markets. Transparency can also be increased by disclosing past transaction data (post-trade transparency) or moving trading to platforms where traders can see all available quotes (pre-trade transparency). In Optimal Transparency in Over-the-Counter Markets (with Maren Vairo), we build a dynamic trading model with adverse selection that allows us to compare different transparency regimes. We show that post-trade transparency improves upon an opaque market but is dominated by pre-trade transparency. Moreover, adding post-trade transparency to a market with pre-trade transparency may have detrimental effects on welfare. We then go beyond comparing existing transparency regimes and use mechanism design to characterize the optimal trading mechanism. We construct an implementation of the optimal trading mechanism that resembles a second price auction with post-auction negotiations, and features pre-trade but not post-trade transparency.
I had the privilege to co-author a survey article about the research of Paul Milgrom (my co-advisor) and Bob Wilson, following their 2020 Nobel prize in Economics: Discovering Auctions: Contributions of Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson (with Alexander Teytelboym, Shengwu Li, Scott Kominers, and Mohammad Akbarpour).
I was involved in the design of the Polish kidney exchange program. Even though I am no longer active in this area, you can read about the program in a survey article to which I contributed a chapter: Modelling and optimisation in European Kidney Exchange Programmes.
Here are two very old papers, just for fun (I used to do macro!)
Optimal Constants in a LlogL Inequality for Continuous Martingales (in Polish), Undergraduate Thesis in Mathematics, 2012
Fiscal Policy Under Rational Inattention, Undergraduate Thesis in Economics, 2011
Working Papers:
with Frank Yang
■ Privacy for Sale: Anarchy, Ban, or Market?
with Jacopo Perego and Laura Veldkamp
■ Pareto-Improving Pricing: Why 3 Is Better Than 2
with Zi Yang Kang;
Extended abstract at EC'26 conference
with Alex Smolin; R&R at Quarterly Journal of Economics; Extended abstract at EC'26 conference
■ Optimal Redistribution via Income Taxation and Market Design
with Pawel Doligalski, Mohammad Akbarpour, and Scott Kominers
■ A Price Theory of Price Gouging
with Scott Kominers;
R&R at Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics
with Marco Reuter, Scott Kominers, and Changhwa Lee;
Extended abstract at EC'25 conference
■ A market-design response to the European energy crisis
with Filip Tokarski, Mohammad Akbarpour, and Scott Kominers
■ Are Simple Mechanisms Optimal when Agents are Unsophisticated?
with Jiangtao Li;
R&R at American Economic Review;
Extended abstract at EC'21 conference
Publications:
■ A mechanism-design approach to property rights
with Ellen Muir;
Forthcoming at Econometrica;
Extended abstract at EC'24 conference
■ Optimal Transparency in Over-the-Counter Markets (Online Appendix)
with Maren Vairo;
Forthcoming at American Economic Review
■ Comparison of Screening Devices
with Frank Yang and Mohammad Akbarpour;
Forthcoming at Journal of Political Economy;
Extended abstract at EC'23 conference
■ How to Allocate Money? (formerly Equity-efficiency trade-off in quasi-linear environments)
AEJ: Microeconomics, Volume 18, Number 1, February 2026
with Pawel Doligalski, Joanna Krysta, and Filip Tokarski;
Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, Volume 3, Number 3, August 2025
with Anton Kolotilin;
Theoretical Economics, Volume 19, Number 4, November 2024
■ Inequality and Market Design
ACM SIGecom Exchanges, Volume 22.1, June 2024
■ Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms
with Mohammad Akbarpour ® Scott Kominers; Journal of Political Economy, Volume 132, Number 6, June 2024
■ An Economic Framework for Vaccine Prioritization
with Mohammad Akbarpour ® Eric Budish ® Scott Kominers; Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 139, Issue 1, February 2024
■ Preparing for the Worst but Hoping for the Best: Robust (Bayesian) Persuasion
with Alessandro Pavan; Econometrica, Volume 90, Issue 5, September 2022
■ Redistribution through Markets
with Scott Kominers ® Mohammad Akbarpour; Econometrica, Volume 89, Issue 4, July 2021
■ Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains [Older version with additional results]
Operations Research, Volume 69, Issue 2, March-April 2021; Best Paper with Student Lead Author award at the EC'16 conference [EC version]
with Darrell Duffie Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 142, Issue 2, November 2021; Awarded second-place Fama-DFA award; A non-technical summary at VOX: Robust Financial Market Benchmarks
■ Discovering Auctions: Contributions of Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson
with Alexander Teytelboym ® Shengwu Li ® Scott Kominers ® Mohammad Akbarpour; Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Volume 123, Issue 3, July 2021
■ Modelling and optimisation in European Kidney Exchange Programmes
with Péter Biró, Joris van der Klundert, David Manlove et al.; European Journal of Operational Research, Volume 291, Issue 2, June 2021
■ Mechanism Design with Aftermarkets: Cutoff Mechanisms [Online Appendix] [Older version]
Econometrica, Volume 88, Issue 6, November 2020
■ The Simple Economics of Optimal Persuasion
with Giorgio Martini; Journal of Political Economy, Volume 127, Number 5, October 2019 (lead article)
■ Implementability, Walrasian Equilibria, and Efficient Matchings
with Anthony Zhang; Economics Letters, Volume 153, April 2017
■ Benchmarks in Search Markets [Online Appendix]
with Darrell Duffie and Haoxiang Zhu;
Journal of Finance, Volume 72, Issue 5 October 2017;
Awarded the Amundi Smith Breeden First Prize;
A non-technical summary at VOX: In Support of Transparent Financial Benchmarks
Permanent working papers:
■ Mechanism Design with Aftermarkets: Optimal Mechanisms under Binary Actions [Online Appendix]
■ Mechanism Design with Aftermarkets: On the Impossibility of Pure Information Intermediation
■ The Effects of Post-Auction Bargaining between Bidders [Online Appendix]
- Photo credit: Randy Belice, Northwestern University ↩︎